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Case No. 18231 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KUTV, Inc., Deseret News Publishing Company, 
KSL AM and TV, a Division of Bonneville 
International Corporation, and Society of 
Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Utah Chapter 
Petitioners, 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, District Judge 
and Ronald Dale Easthope 
Respondents. 
COMPLAINT AND PETITION 
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF KSL AM 
AND TV AND SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS 
Petitioners KSL AM and TV, a division of Bonneville 
International Corporation and Society of Professional 
Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Utah Chapter, respectfully submit 
this memorandum of points and authorities in support of their 
petition. 
The petitioners challenge the district court's gag order 
which barred any media reference to Ronald Dale Easthope 
(Easthope) as the "Sugar House rapist" or to his prior criminal 
record during the pendency of Mr. Easthope's trial in State of 
Utah v. Ronald Dale Easthope, CRSl-1349. 
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I. THE DISTRICT COURT ENTERED A GAG ORDER PRECLUDING THE MEDIA 
FROM REPORTING ELEVEN-YEAR-OLD FACTS. 
Eleven years ago Easthope captured considerable media atten-
tion when he became known as the Sugar House rapist after the 
state charged him with a series of related sexual assaults in the 
Sugar House area of Salt Lake City. In June, 1971, Easthope was 
convicted of two counts of rape and sentenced to prison. Ten 
years later, in September, 1981, while on parol from prison, 
Easthope was charged with another rape. KSL radio, the Salt Lake 
Tribune, and the Deseret News all reported that Easthope, the man 
convicted of rape in 1971 and known as the "Sugar House rapist", 
faced new but similar charges. Later, in October, 1981, the 
Tribune reported the postponement of Easthope's preliminary 
hearing, and again referred to him as the "Sugar House rapist." 
(The radio broadcast transcript and newspaper articles are 
appended as Exhibit A.) 
On February 3, 1982, when Easthope's trial began, his counsel 
asked the court to sequester the jury, arguing that sequestration 
would prevent any possible prejudice from media coverage of the 
trial. (Partial Transcript designated as "Judge's Order", p.2, 
appended as Exhibit B) The court, apparently satisfied that 
there was no danger of prejudice from publicity denied the motion 
but expressly encouraged counsel to renew it if necessary. 
-3-
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Near the close of the first day's testimony, defense counsel 
recognized a reporter from KUTV in the courtroom. The reporter 
was invited to chambers where the following colloquy occurred: 
The Court: Let me see counsel in chambers. 
The record should show the proceedings are in 
chambers in the absence of the jury. And did 
you contact -the news director or whoever it 
was? Okay. Does your station come to any 
conclusion? 
Mr. [Dick] Allgire: I am supposed to call them 
back right now. 
The Court: Okay. I am going to do this, 
because I think it would be highly prejudicial 
to refer to him [Easthope] in any news report 
as the "Sugarhouse rapist"; I am going to 
issue an order that none of the news media is 
to use the term "Sugarhouse rapist" during the 
course of the trial, because I think it is 
highly prejudicial. 
Mr. Brown: Could that order go further to any 
comment surrounding the proceeding of Mr. 
Easthope ten or eleven years aryo; that's the 
reason I made the motion to sequester the 
jury, Your Honor, because I anticipated that. 
The Court: I think that I will extend it to 
any comments about Mr. Easthope's activities 
prior to the trial that would in any way show 
his involvement with the law. 
Dick, I am not trying to cut the news 
media out. I want a fair trial, I don't want 
to have any statement made for publicity that 
would be adverse to the defendant because he 
is entitled to a free and fair trial. 
* * * 
Mr. Allgire: Can we wait? My attorney 
should be calling any second. They wanted me 
to talk to him before I say anything. 
-4-
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The Court: Sure. I'll talk to him if you 
want. Tell him the same thing. You can talk 
to him and you can use my phone if you want. 
(Tr. pp 4-6, Exh. B) 
When KUTV's counsel.arrived, the District Court repeated the 
substance of its gag order and refused to vacate it. At 
counsel's request the District Court si~ned a written order on 
the same terms as his oral order. ("Order," dated February 4, 
1982, appended as Exhibit C). This Court refused KUTV's 
emergency motion to stay the criminal proceedings, and shortly 
thereafter, on February 4, 1982, this petition was filed. On 
February 8, 1982, the juri found Easthope guilty of aggravated 
sexual assault.* 
* Although the jury in the Easthope trial has returned a ver-
dict, this controversy is not moot. Because the gag order in 
a criminal trial is inherently limited by the duration of the 
trial, it necessarily presents an issue capable of repetition 
yet evading review. As such, the gag order here presents a 
recognized exception to the mootness doctrine. Nebraska 
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976). As Justice 
Stewart recently noted in Wickham v. Fisher: 
The principles that determine the justiciabi-
li ty of the instant case are the well-established 
rules which permit a court to ~itigate an issue 
which, although technically moot as to a parti-
cular litigant at the time of appeal, is of 
wide concern, affects the public interest, is 
likely to recur in a similar manner, and, 
because of the brief time any one person is 
affected, would otherwise likely escape judi-
cial review. 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah, 1981). 
The Petition now before this Court raises, for the second 
time in seven months, issues concerning the safeguards 
required by the First Amendment in cases or trials of public 
interest and importance. See KUTV, Inc. v. Honorable Dean 
E. Conder and John Preston Creer, Case No. 17822. The nature 
of the issues involved as well as their demonstrated repeti-
tion compel consideration of the gag order's validity. 
-s-
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II. GAG ORDERS MAY BE USED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT. 
Courts abhor prior restraints, such as gag orders, because they 
constitute "the most serious and least tolerable infringement on 
First Amendment rights." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 
539, 559 (1976). Unlike virtually any other judicial procedure, 
prior restraints impose an "immediate and irreversible sanction." 
Id. Most importantly, however, prior restraints strike at the 
very heart of the democratic principles which spawned First 
Amendment guarantees. As Justice Stewart stated in New York 
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 
L.Ed.2d 822, 832-33 (1971), 
[A] press that is alert, aware and free most 
vitally serves the basic purpose of the First 
Amendment. For without an informed and free 
press there cannot be an enlightened people. 
In light of these grave consequences, the United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "(a]ny system of prior 
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 9 L.Ed.2d 584, 593, 83 S.Ct. 631 
(1963). See also, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
at 714; Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 
419, 9-S.Ct. 1575, 29 L.Ed.2d 1, 6 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 
u.s. 697, 51 s.ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). Thus, any attempt 
-6-
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to impose a prior restraint "carries a heavy burden of showing 
justification for the imposition of such a restraint." 
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, supra, 402 U.S. at 
419; New York Times Co. v. United States, supra, 403 U.S. at 714. 
So difficult is it to overcome the presumption of unconstitu-
tionality, that the narrow class of cases upholding prior 
restraints involve only war or equally extreme circumstances. New 
York Times Co. v. United States, supra, 403 U.S. at 726, 
(Brennan, J. concurring.) 
III. THIS GAG ORDER WAS UNNECESSARY AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A. Before a Court May Impose A Prior Restraint, It Must 
Observe Constitutionally Required Procedures To 
Determine Whether The Restraint Is Unavoidable. 
In order to overcome the heavy presumption against the impo-
sition of a prior restraint, the Constitution requires a careful 
and thorough procedure designed to establish a clear record 
requiring the restraint. As the Supreme Court stated in Carroll 
v. Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181, 89 s. Ct. 
400, 29 L.Ed.2d 325, 331 (1968): 
And even where this presumption [of unconsti-
tionali ty] might otherwise be overcome, the 
Court has insisted upon careful procedural 
provisions, designed to assure the fullest 
presentation and consideration of the matter 
which the circumstances permit. As the Court 
said in Freedman v. Maryland, [380 U.S. 58, 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 L.Ed.2d at 654, a noncriminal process of 
prior restraints upon expression "avoids 
constitutional infirmity only if it takes 
place under procedural safeguards designed to 
obviate the dangers of a censorship system. 
At a minimum, that procedure requira.s first that evidence be 
adduced to establish that a clear and present danger would result 
from the challenged publication. 
In each case courts must ask whether the gra-
vity of the 'evil' discounted by its improba-
bility, justifies such invasion of free speech 
as is necessary to avoid the danger. Dennis 
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510, 71 s. Ct. 
857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951). 
The landmark case of Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 
539 (1976), applied the standards of these earlier Supreme Court 
prior restraint holdings specifically to gag orders. The case 
began with the murder of six members of a family in a small 
Nebraska town, an act which immediately attracted widespread, 
national news coverage. The defendant quickly argued that the 
extensive publicity jeopardized his fair trial rights, and 
requested the trial court to issue a protective order banning 
further coverage. After an abreviated hearing, the Court found 
"a clear and present danger that pre-trial publicity could 
impinge upon the defendant's right to a fair trial." Nebraska 
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S. at 543. The Court then 
issued an order prohibiting newspapers from publishing certain 
-8-
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known facts such as the existence or contents or the accused's 
confession and the contents of a note he had written the night of 
the crime. That broad protective order was upheld by the 
Nebraska Supreme Court, but the United States Supreme Court found 
it to be unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court's opinion diagramed the Constitutional 
safeguards which all courts must follow before issuing a gag 
order. As a safeguard against judicial censorship, this rigorous 
procedure requires a trial judge to record findings of fact on 
each of the following: 
"(a) the nature and extent of pretrial news 
coverage; 
(b) whether other measures would be likely to 
mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial 
publicity; and 
(c) how effectively a restraining order would 
operate to prevent the threatened danger." 
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, supra, 427 
U.S. at 562. 
After reviewing these procedures the Court held that the 
Nebraska trial court erred in issuing its gag order because it 
failed to make express findings that measures other than a gag 
order would mitigate the effects of the pretrial publicity. 
Specifically, the Court held that the trial court should have 
considered and entered findings on the following alternatives: 
-9-
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(a) change of trial venue to a place less 
exposed to the intense publicity; 
(b) postponement of the trial to allow public 
attention to subside; 
{c) searching questioning of prospective _ 
jurors to screen out those with fixed 
opinions as to guilt or innocence; 
(d) the use of emphatic and clear instruc-
tions on the sworn duty of each juror to 
decide the issues only on evidence pre-
sented in open court; and 
(e) sequestration of jurors. Nebraska Press 
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563-564. 
After examining the record, the Supreme Court determined that 
there was no evidence or finding that these alternative measures 
would have been ineffective in protecting the defendant's right. 
Conversely, there was no finding that the gag order would have 
been effective. The Court concluded that the defendant failed to 
meet the "heavy burden imposed as a condition to securing a prior 
restraint." 
B. The District Court Failed To Follow The Procedure 
Required By The Constitution Before A Court May 
Limit The Media. 
1. The record shows no evidence that media 
coverage created a clear and present danger. 
The record in this case fails at the very first step. 
Nebraska Press requires a finding that media coverage posed clear 
-10-
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and present danger. The record before the district court in 
Nebraska Press suggested pervasive publicity, from the date of 
the crime through the court's ruling. By contrast, the record in 
this case reflects no inquiry into the scope and nature of media 
coverage. Whatever pretrial publicity may have occurred, the 
parties and the court were satisfied that media coverage had not 
affected the jury panel. (See, Exh. A) Cf. State v. Pierre, 572 
P.2d 1338 1348-49 (Utah, 1977), cert. c~n. 439 U.S. 882. Thus, 
the District Court's only task was to assure the impartiality of 
the sitting jury during the course of a short trial. Apparently, 
at one point before the reporter appeared in court the court 
concluded that the threat of "anticipated" media coverage did not 
present a danger to a fair trial, and denied the defendant's 
motion to sequester the jury. (Partial Transcript, p. 2, 
appended as Exhibit B) In these circumstances, it is remarkable 
that the district court was so quick to enter its gag order upon 
the appearance of only one reporter in the courtroom. 
Apparently, the District Judge entered the Order based only on 
his notion that any publicity would affect the trial: 
"Okay, I am going to do this [enter the order] 
because I think it would be highly prejudicial 
to refer to him in any news re~ort as the 
-11-
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"Sugarhouse rapist". • • • (Partial Trans., 
pp. 4-5 appended as Exhibit B).~/ 
As Justice Brennan stated in New York Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U.S. at 725, 
[t]he First Amendment tolerates absolutely no 
prior judicial restraints of the press predi-
cated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward 
consequences may result. 
Under Nebraska Press procedures, then, the district court's 
failure to determine the nature and extent of the news coverage 
precluded any sustainable finding of a clear and present danger. 
Without that initial investigation and related finding, there can 
be no legal prior restraint on the media. The district court's 
~/ Disregarding the Order's impairment of, the First 
Amendment, the order suffers from enormous jurisdic-
tional and due process defects. Like the trial court 
order in Nebraska Press, the order here purports to 
apply broadly to all members of the media, even though 
the court has no jurisdiction over them. Nebraska Press 
Ass'n v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S. at 565-566 n.9. 
Moreover, the order purports to restrain all members of 
the media from exercising fundamental rights without 
affording them the opportunity to be heard. Id. Both 
of those defects invalidate the gag order in this case. 
The inadequacy of this record is unquestionable. There 
was no evidence or finding that could lead to the 
conclusion that media coverage posed a clear and present 
danger. There was nothing but the Court's conjecture. 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
order failed at the very first step of the inquiry. Although the 
finding of a clear and present danger is the essential precon-
dition to any valid restraint, it is only the beginning of the 
examination. 
2. The trial court failed to evaluate less 
restrictive alternative remedies. 
If the record in this case had revealed solid evidence of a 
clear and present danger, the Constitution would have required 
the Court to exhaust all alternative remedies, no matter how 
inconvenient, before it considered any abridgment of the First 
Amendment. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 
100 S. Ct. 2814, 2829 (1980); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 
U.S. at 569; Des Moines Register & Tribune Co. v. Hildreth, 181 
N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1970). 
Even if the trial court had properly reviewed the facts and 
found a clear and present danger, it could have avoided a consti-
tutional conflict if it had merely considered alternatives to a 
gag order. But the· trial court issued this gag order without 
even considering alternative remedies. Given the speculative 
basis for the inference of a danger in the first place, it is 
likely that the court's objective of preserving a fair trial 
could have been accomplished with moderate alternatives, such as 
instructions to the jury to avoid newspaper and electronic news 
during the trial and daily voir dire of jury members. Even the· 
inconvenience that sequestration might have caused the jury is 
-13-
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inconsequential compared to the concern of preserving the First 
Amendment. 
[T]he inconvenience suffered by jurors who 
are sequestered to prevent exposure to 
excluded evidence which may be published in 
the press is a small price to pay for the 
public's right to timely knowledge of trial 
proceedings guaranteed by free~om of the 
press. . • • ' 
State ex rel. Miami Herald Pub. v. Mcintosh, 340 So.2d 904, 910 
(Fla. 1977). 
It seems certain that if the District Court had followed the 
procedures described in Nebraska Press it would not have imposed 
a gag order, if for no other reason than the order could not pre-
vent the perceived danger. The information barred by the order 
had been released to the publi9 in official court records and had 
been in the public official court records and had been in the 
public not only ten years before, but just prior to trial. The 
information was openly available to the jury irrespective of the 
court's order. Thus, the Court's order could not insure that 
Easthope's title and record would not b~come known to the jury. 
In addition, as a matter of clear Constitutional law, that kind 
of published, historical information is simply not subject to 
prior restraint. "[T]he press may not be prohibited from 
'truthfully publishing information released to the public in 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
official court records' Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 
469 (1975) ." Oklahoma Publishing v. District Court, 430 U.S. 
308 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 568. 
c. In This Case There was No Conflict Between The 
First and Sixth Amendments. 
The gag order may have been based on a sincere but unsup-
ported belief that the reporting of Easthope's prior criminal 
record would preclude his fair trial. By issuing the gag order 
to protect fair trial rights, however, the District Court 
apparently constructed a false conflict between the First and 
Sixth Amendments and gave the Sixth Amendment preference. 
The Bill of Rights assigns no priorities between the rights 
of the First and Sixth Amendments. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
held that neither necessarily takes ascendancy over the other and 
that the courts are required to preserve both. Nebraska Press 
Ass'n v. Stuart, supra, 427 U.S. at 566, 562. The gag order in 
this case violates that basic Constitutional principle by giving 
absolute ascendency to the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, the 
District Court took that unprecedented legal posture without any 
basis in the record for the slightest, let alone the most 
stringent, of First Amendment proscriptions. Prior restraint of 
the pr.ess was plainly not justified in this case. 
Other state courts in following the required constitutional 
and procedural safeguards, have refused to issue gag orders in 
-15-
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cases virtually identical to this one. In Arkansas Gazette Co. 
v. Lofton, 598 S.W.2d 745 (Ark. 1980), the defendant had been 
convicted of two rapes committed in the Quapaw Quarter of Little 
Rock. Prior to trial for another rape the trial court issued a 
gag order restraining the Gazette from referring to the defendant 
as the "Quapaw Quarter rapist" in any pre-trial stories. The 
Gazette took a writ to the Arkansas Supreme Court which found the 
order unconstitutional. In reaching that decision the court 
recognized that the gag order constituted constitutionally imper-
missible judicial censorship of the news media: 
We are cited no case nor does our research 
reveal one which permits judicial censorship 
of the use of descriptive words by the news 
media. In effect, here the press was merely 
paraphrasing what the public records reveal. 
use of the phrase by the petitioner is pro-
tected by the federal First Amendment and Art. 
2, §6, of our own consitution. The restraint 
of these constitutional rights amounts to a 
judicial censorship which is beyond the juris-
diction of this or any court. Therefore, the 
restraint imposed by the court cannot pass 
constitutional scrutiny. 
598 S.W.2d at 746-747. (emphasis added). See also, Randolph v. 
NBC, 7 Med. L. Rep. 1339 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
-16-
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's gag order 
should be vacated. 
-17-
NEBEKER 
Attorneys for KSL nd TV, 
a Division of Bonneville 
International Corporation, 
and Society of Professional 
Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, 
Utah Chapter 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES OF KSL AM AND TV AND 
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS IN SUPPORT OF THE COMPLAINT 
AND PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF was mailed, postage 
prepaid this 13th day of May, 1982 to: 
Honorable Dean E. Conder 
District Judge 
Third Judicial District Court 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
Salt Lake City~ Utah 84111 
Thomas P. Vuyk, Esq 
SALT LAKE COUNT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
George M. McMillan, Esq. 
Patrick A. Shea, Esq. 
Kate Lahey, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Lynn R. Brown, Esq. 
LEGAL DEFENDERS OFFICE 
333 South Second East #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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K-48 : I~ 
thorum: sugarhouse rapist violates parole 
rmic 4pm 
EXHIBIT "A" - Page 1 
KSL Radio 
~ l N 1971 Tr£ MAi K,·~tJHfi J.S THE SUGAPJ-i:JJSE RAP I ST WAS CQ\N I CTEO OF 
RAPE Ai'iD SE~ .. ff TO PRIS°'i. (}l JJLY 14TH THIS YEM, RO.·~:t.. EASTHtJ>E WAS 
PMQED. S.ALT LAKE Cl TY W p·)LICE SGT. LARHY THaui SAYS EASTHJ:>E WAS 
ARRESTED TH I S WEEK8·;0 O.~ XMm SJSP l Cl \Jl~ lF RAPE QiARGES. 
:19 ••• that rape •••••• 
"arrested a male whi.te for a rape that occurred in the area of eleventh 
east and rlownington on the ~orning of Saturday the ninteenth. He was 
arrested Sunday morning in the downtown area and charged with that rape." 
TH®IH SAYS I 1.J'Olt\A Tl •1~ FRJ1 A;~ Uri-1U-.'1ED 5;lJRCE LEAD TD EASTHOPE 'S 
.ARREST. TEN YEARS AGO EASTHJPE auorn p 1.1 CE FOR SEVER.al H{);1lHS BEFORE 
~XX tE WftS f 1.tPLL Y ARRESTED A1~ C~NI CTEO. · 
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EXHIBIT "A" - Page 2 
Deseret News 
. !"·-..•. 
·,Rapist cParged agair;. . · · ·<fa · ·:s~.7:._:~ ~;~·]"':-;..::·,:: .. · ... ·- ·------.~~-
_ . • ..... ·~·· ·> .. StP 2 4 198r< 
·f· '.,, A· man who was termed the .-.Sugar House - ~·. - . · 
.'rapist," out of prison tM11>..#A. monilis. has been :. ·. • :\ 
J ~~arged with icxua~. a1i!t of a 17-year-old girl. .: : ~-. : .. 
:!-:. · · R~ld~ ~e. 35, 1~5 W. 2280 South. was .. '··.·-: . 
. ·!·charg ggravated se ~ult, :i first- .. ·~--~.·~~-· 
.:j degre elo , · in an · inform · signed by Sgt. ·: ~ > :~ ·: 
~j R.ich . Thorum. z· t Lake . ty ~olicc, befor~ 5th ; ~: ::-
1 Circw Judge ~tef'1 Morns. · · · ·· · ·. '-. · 
r;~-~E~s~~~pe ~~t ~~~~~~~ape ~~fc~f:n1~1r~~-::{~~~I 
wiili it ll\D)t'\e7'counts of rapc.J.O lY and burglary ~;: :-:·-
in. connEW"on with incid~nt ·~ ugar House area < .. ·. · ··1 
during 1970 andfil. rvcd nine years. in ili.e .:. ~; ·, · ·' 
Utah ~tate Priso . Q.J ·" . ·. ·-~.,~ :< ; 
· · In the m~ nt incident, a9\::irl awoke early -~ : · · -
' Saturday mo ·ug to find a man with a pillow_ case '::t~~::. 
\ over his hea ith eye holes cut in it. J,11e man ... ·i;~e".:_ 
r threatened-her with a.large ltjtchen knife.and.ilien ~~-~'~" 
raped her · ·'.·:• · • .. ·· ·· ·.-' '"::- .,... - -. -: · .. · ..... : .. =· ·_:! '' ... ~·: 
The t;pical method of the Suga~ House rapist in . -; >: -~~= 
1970, was to approach sleeping victims after · ~· ,: 
breaking into their apartments and rape them after:7 ; . ·. 
threatening iliem with a gun. '. · , ... : ·~ :::· · · · · · 
: .: · Easthopc was arrested in a Salt Lake hotel/:·.;~ ·'-· 
. coffee shop later Saturday. morning. : '. · · .7 .• ·' -~~ r ·~.. 
He is currently on parole from the Utah State ·. 
Prison. and has been booked into the Salt Lake 
County Jail. He is bc_ing held without bail. · 
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Salt Lake Tribune 
~. 
EXHIBIT "A" - Page 3 
/ 
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23 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH 
IW.AND FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
The STATE OF UTAH, 
* 
Plaintiff. 
* Case No. CR. ·81.::. 1349 
-vs- * 
JUDGE'S ORDER 
* 
RONALD D. EASTHOPE, 
Defendant. * 
* 
* 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the Third day of February, 1982 
the above-entitl~d cause of action came on regularly for heati_g 
before the Hon. Dean E. Conder, one of the Judges of the above 
named Court and at the hour of ten o'clock a.m. 
APPEARANCES 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
HAI.. M. WAL.TON. C.S.R. 
__ J 
Ml:. Ernie Jones 
Deputy Ct. Attorney 
431 S. Third East 
City 
Mr. Lynn· Brown 
Legal Defenders 
333 S. Second East 
City 
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2 
3 
IN CHAMBERS : 
The court: In the matter of the State of Utah versus 
4 Ronald Dale Easthope. You're Mr. Ronald Dale Easthope, are 
5 you sir? 
6 Mr. Easthope: Yes, sir. 
7 The court: You're here represented by counsel. These 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
1Ci 
17 
18 
rn 
20 
21 
22 
23 
2-1: 
25 
26 
proceedings are in chambers in the absence of the Jury. 
Mr. Brown, I understand you have a couple of moticns. 
Mr. Brown: Someti.lt'\e ago we filed two motions Your Honer. 
Filed a motion to sequester the jury and filed a motion to 
suppress or limit the statements of witnesses concerning any 
testimony regarding the fact that Mr. Easthope has been 
previously convicted of anything and previously incarcerated. 
First, dealing with the question of the motion to 
sequester the jury. 
Mr. Easthope in the past, has had some publicity, 
approximately ten or~eieven years ago;considerable ammount of 
publicity;arid probably the Court remembers or is aware of some 
of the publicity he had at the time. 
At the time this case was filed and shortl~:~efore the 
preliminary hearing, at least one news channel--Channel Two 
called me up and wanted to do interviews with Mr. Easthope anc 
:bntended on covering the preliminary hearing. And I anticipated 
that there would be a considerable ammount of news coverage 
involving the trial of Mr. Easthope. 
For that reason I made a motion to sequester the jury to 
prevent any possibility that any members of the jury panel 
could read any news reports, hear any television coverage or 
27 
28 
29 
30 talk with anybody that may know something about the case, or rave 
HAI. M. WAI.TON, e.s.R. 2 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
read any publicity or heard any television reports. 
It might be premature at this point. In looking arourld th~ 
Courtroom, I don1t know that there is any press or television 
people out there at this time. If the Court woulil take that 
under advisement and we could observe what press or televisio~ 
coverage that we get throughout this trial. 
Perh~ps the Court could rule on that motion this evening 
when we recess for the day. But that concerns me, ·the fact 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Hi 
17 
18 
rn 
20 
that there is po~entially a good deal of--
The Court: Was there much publicity in connection with 
the preliminary hearing? 
. Mr. Brown: 
The court: 
Mr. Brown: 
No, there wasn~t . 
I didn't see any. 
No television coverage at all at the 
preliminary hearing, and I never sought any news coverage. 
The Court: I am going to deny the motim at this time, 
but leave the door open for further renewal of the motion 
should you see if there is some problem. 
Mr. Brown: With regard to the second motion concernin<~ 
the testimony of witnesses. I already talked to Mr. Jones 
21 
about that and he indicated that he would instruct his witnesses-
22 
correct me if I am wrong--nat to mention anything about the 
23 
fact that Mr. Easthape is in prison, 9r not to mention anyth~ng 
24 
about the fact that he has been previously convicted of anyt~ing 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
I am particularly concerned about the testimony of Mr. 
Hanks, where he stated at the preliminary hearing that Mr. 
Easthope made a statement to him to th~ effect that" I did it 
again;• which implies that he had done something similar to 
that in the past. If that could be regulated or---
HAl.. M. WAl..TON, c.s.R. 
3 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
7 
10 
11 
12 
13 
H 
The court: I don't think there is any question but wha. 
there should be no reference to prior offenses, if any. And 
I nave been advised that this is commonly known as the 
" Sugarhouse rapist". 
I am going to ask both counsel to admonish all witnesses 
that they make no reference to any prior rapes or convictions 
of any kind. To try this case strictly on the facts of this 
particular case. 
Mr. Brown: we are concerned about Mr. Jones in his 
questioning to the victim at the preliminary hearing, quite 
frequently referred to the Sugarhouse area. Like to get away 
from that too;that might bring back some memories among the 
jury panel about all these rapes that took,'.p).ace in the 
Sugarhouse area. 
15 
lG 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
The court: I think Mr. Jones that you can refer to it 
in a more specific--
Mr. Jones: Ten ten Downing.ton Avenue. 
The court: --Without referreing to the Sugarhouse. 
Ten ten Downington Avenue there is no association with it. 
Mr. Brown: Downington Avenue is okay. That's east and 
west. 
(Whereupon the trial proceeded to the conclusion of the 
victims testimony.) 
The Court: Let me see counsel in chambers. The recor;~ 24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
should show the proceedings are in chambers in the absence of 
the jury. And did you contact the news director or whoever i~ 
was? Okay. Does your station come to any conclusion ? 
Mr. lllgire: I am supposed to call them back right now. 
The Court: Okay. I am g6ing to do this, because I 
think it would be highly prejudiciallto refer~to him in any 
HAI.. M. WAI.TOH, C:.S.R, 
4 
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news report as the "Sugarhouse rapist";I am going to 
2 issue an order that none of the news media is to use the terr~ 
3 " Sugarhouse rapist" during the course of the trial, because 
4 I think. iT is highly prejudicial. 
5 Mr. Brown: Could that order go further to any comment 
surrounding the proceeding of Mr. Easthope ten or eleven yeaJs 
ago;that's the reason I made the motion to sequester the jur~, 
Your Honor, because I anticipated that. 
7 
8 
9 The Court: I think. that I'wilLextend it to any commerts 
IO about Mr. Easthopes activities prior to the trial that would 
11 in any way show his involvement with the law. 
12 Dick, I am not trying to cut the news media out. I 
~ want a fair trial, I don~t want to have any sta~ement made 
14 for publicity that would be adverse to the defendant because 
15 he is entitled to a free and fair trial. 
_ _J 
Hi 
17 
18 
1!) 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Mr. Allgire: May I use your phone? 
The Court: You can call whomever you wish right now 
Mr. Allgire: (Speaking into phone:) We are in chambers 
and the Judge has ordered that we make no comment about 
Easthope's prior activities or involvment with the law. 
we would lik.e to have our attorney call. 
The Court: Call that number and the baillif will put 
you through. I think for a fair trial I am going to make thct 
24 an order. Do you know how to get the news to the rest of thE~ 
25 
26 
news media, as you see them, that this is going to be my ordEr. 
I don't want to have any adverse publicity. 
27 Mr. Allgire: Well, if they aren't here, I'll tell MikE 
28 carter of the Tribune. Don't know if anyone else is aware o 
29 the trial. 
30 The Court: I don't know how else unless I call the 
HAI.. M. WAI.TON, c.s.R. 5 . 
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news media. Okay we'll go·back in.9RHf~· 
2 Mr. Allgire: can we wait? My attorney shou~d be callincr 
3 any second. They wanted me to talk to him before I say anyth ng. 
4 '.ll.he court: Sure. I'll talk to him if you want. Tell h~l 
5 the same thing. You can talk to him and you can use my 
6 phone if you want. 
7 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
8 
9 Salt Lake county) 
10 State of Utah ss. 
11 
I, Hal M. Walton do hereby certify that I am 
12 
a certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of Utah;that on 
13 
the Third day of February,· 1982 I took down the preceding 
14 
hearing in chambers and transcribed it into the preceding 
15 
true record~ UJJ£' 
H.M .--wai to~ c. s ::~· Cl'. 
five pages and is a 
Hi 
17 
18 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
HAL. M. WAL.TON, c.s.R. 
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EXHIBIT 11 C 11 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
,STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER 
) 
-vs- ) CR 81-1349 ) 
RONALD DALE EASTHOPE, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
During the proceedings in the above-entitled matter, I 
requested a reporter from KUTV, Inc. to come to my chambers 
with the Prosecutor, the Defendant, and counsel for the Defendant. 
In chambers I indicated the Court's concern for the Defendant's 
rights to a fair trial if certain terms or past criminal records 
were mentioned by the news media. Accordingly, 
· IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
The news media in and for Salt Lake County and the State 
of Utah are prohibited from broadcasting, publishing or other-
wise conveying to the public any of the following: 
1) The words "Sugarhouse rapist", 
2) Any information relating to the past convictions of 
defendant Ronald Dale Easthope, 
during the pendency of the above-entitled matter b~fore this 
Court. 
DATED this 4th day of February, 1982. 
··~;~ 
_;{,,), .:vC 
BY THE COURT: 
·, t:· 
.. -."- ·-~~v:-~':'kt-t y( / 
Dean E. Conder, District Judge 
S".<r.J~Lc~ -~.,.,.._,,,4 ~ <J ( l'-LP~!-.....f ~ 
VAN COTT. BAGL.EY. CORNWAL.L. !It MCCARTHY 
A ~111torCSSIONA\.. C:OAP'OlllATION 
SUITt 1100, SO SOUTH MAIM STllll:CCT 
SAl.T I.AKE C:ITY, UTAH B•t•• 
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